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Bowland v. Municipal Court Revisited:
A Defense Perspective on Unlicensed

Midwife Practice in California

HARRY M. CALDWELL*

In 1976, the California Supreme Court in Bowland v. Municopal
Court1 addressed the right to privacy of an expectant mother who
chooses to use the services of a lay midwife. The issue surfaced in the
successful criminal prosecution of a lay midwife2 for violating section
2141 of the California Business and Professions Code 3, the unlicensed
practice of medicine. The Bowland court refused to recognize a fundamental right of privacy in the decision of an expectant mother to have a
home birth or to be assisted during the home birth by a lay midwife.
Bowland remains the seminal decision, as the issue has not again resurfaced in California.
Interim developments as well as several overlooked or inadequately
considered perspectives render Bowland at best suspect, and clearly
ripe for re-examination. Since the 1976 Bowland decision, the Califor* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, B.A. 1972 California
State University, Long Beach; J.D. 1976, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Glen Nakawaki for his extensive research and critical comments.
1. 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976).
2. The distinction between a certified midwife and a lay midwife generally may be traced to
the nature and extent of the prior educational training lay midwives rely on, knowledge of the
physical processes of labor and the impact of a personalized involvement by the labor assistant.
In contrast, a certified midwife is minimally an R.N. with additional education and training specifically in midwifery. See Comment, 4 "Birth Right' Home Births, Midwives, and the Right to
Privacy, 12 PAC. L.J. 97, 99-102 (1980).
3. Now BUSINESS & PROF. CODE §2052.
4. 18 Cal. 3d at 495, 556 P.2d at 1088-89, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 637-38.
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nia Supreme Court in City of Santa Barbarav. Adamson5 and Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,6 has refined the

independent state grounds of privacy. Adamson held that the guarantee of privacy based on the California Constitution is more protective
in areas involving sexual freedom and familial autonomy than the federal counterpart.7 In Meyers, the court recognized the fundamental

privacy interest involved in the right to life;8 in the choice to bear children unfettered by discriminatory governmental regulation; 9 in the
right to preserve one's personal health and that of the expectant child;' 0
and in the right to retain personal control over one's own body during

the birth of children." This paper will discuss the impact of Adamson
and Myers in the context of the lay midwife assisted birth.

Another significant interim development that impacts on the Bowland decision is more pragmatic and involves the radical personnel
transformation of the court. 12 From the unanimous Bowland court
only Associate Justices Mosk and Richardson remain. The post-Bowland court comprised of Chief Justice Bird and Associate Justices Mosk,

Kaus, Richardson, Broussard, Newman and Reynoso has demonstrated in cases such as Adamson, Myers, Mandel v. Myers' 3 People v.
Terensinski,'4 and In Re Cummings'5 that the court may be more re5. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980).
6. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172
Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); accord Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Finance, 417 N.E. 2d 387 (Mass.
1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
7. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.2, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3; see Note, Committee
to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Procreative Choice Guaranteedfor All Women, 12
GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 691, 710-11 (1982).
8. 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 792-93, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
9. Id. at 275-76, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
10. Id. at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
11. Id.
12. Justice Richardson wrote the 1976 Bowland court decision. Joining him in concurrence
were Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Clark, McComb, Sullivan and Wright. In 1981, the decision of the
California Supreme Court in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252,
625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 arguably has marked the highest advance yet seen regarding
judicial recognition that the right to privacy under the California Constitution extends a fundamental canopy over the expectant mother in the birthing situation. See in.ra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text. Justice Tobriner wrote the majority opinion in Myers with Chief Justice Bird
writing a separate concurring opinion. Justices Mosk and Newman were also in concurrence, with
Justices Clark and Richardson dissenting. Chief Justice Tobriner retired from the bench in 1982
and will be missed. Nevertheless, in the post-Myers years, Chief Justice Bird has continued to
recognize the viability of the Myers decision. Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 531, 629 P.2d 935, 174
Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981). In People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 640 P.2d 753, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617
(1982) Justice Broussard acknowledged that, as in Meyers, the California high court has on occasion been influenced not to follow parallel federal decisions by the "visor of the dissenging opinion and the incisive academic critism of those decisions." Id. at 836, 640 P.2d at 761, 180 Cal.
Rptr. at 625. One hopes that Justice Broussard may be equally influenced to question push decisions of the high court of California.
13. 29 Cal. 3d 531, 629 P.2d 935, 174 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981).
14. 30 Cal. 3d 822, 640 P.2d 753, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
15. 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1982).
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ceptive to the recognition of an expectant mother's privacy interest of
being assisted during birth by anyone of her choosing.
In addition to these interim developments, this article will examine
several issues that the Bowland court either failed to consider or inadequately considered and which may prove significant in the inevitable
re-examination of the Bowland decision. The Bowland court initially
failed to examine the body of data challenging the assumption that the
risks of home births are sufficiently greater than of hospital births. Adherence to this assumption led the court to override the individual privacy rights of the mother in favor of giving the state the compelling
interest in the unborn child's welfare. If upon re-examination, the
court were to consider the evidence belying this assumption, the cornerstone upon which Bowland was built would be eliminated.
A second issue not adequately discussed in Bowland is the expectant
mother's right to privacy. Indeed, while recognizing the right of an
expectant mother to choose to have her baby at home, the prohibition
in California against lay midwifery places significant restrictions on
persons who may attend the expectant mother. The expectant mother
in the proper exercise of her privacy interests is placed in the dilemma
of choosing between a hospital birth attended by someone perhaps not
of her own choosing, at a location and cost that she may not be able to
afford, or being a party to the lay midwife's criminal act of practicing
medicine without a license.
Finally, this paper will examine the domestic application remedy
provided by section 205816 of the California Business and Professions
Code. Section 2058 creates an exception to the prohibition of the unlicensed practice of medicine. 7 Pursuant to section 2058, a person may
assist a childbirth under "the domestic administration of family remedies." The Bowland court, issuing a blanket exclusion of midwifery
from this exception, failed to examine the activities of the midwife that
should bring them within the exception. Thus, the court failed to provide a basis upon which to distinguish the activities of midwives that
constitute "practicing medicine."
FACTS OF BOWLAND v MUNICIPAL COURT

The plaintiffs in Bowland originally were defendants in criminal proceedings. They were charged with violating section 2141 of the Business and Professions Code by holding themselves out as practicing
16. BUSINESS & PROF. CODE §2058 provides: "Nothing in this chapter prohibits service in
the case of emergency, or the domestic administration of family remedies."
17. Id. §2052.
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midwifery without a license. In defense of the criminal charges, the lay
midwives unsuccessfully postulated that an expectant mother's right to
privacy in her own home included the liberty of choosing those whom
she wished to assist her in the delivery of her child. Thus, section 2052

impermissibly interfered with the expectant mother's fundamental right
to privacy.' Rejecting this argument, the California Supreme Court
drew parallels to the United States Supreme Court decision of Roe v.
Wade. 9 In Roe, the Court held that a state could proscribe abortion
during the third trimester of pregnancy because, at the time the fetus is
viable, the state interest in the life of the unborn child supersedes the
woman's own privacy right. At that point, abortion may be prohibited,
except when necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. 20 The
Bowland court held that California has a similar state interest in the
welfare of the unborn child that overshadows the expectant mother's
right to privacy. The California court thus refused to acknowledge a

fundamental right of privacy in the expectant mother's choice of an
aide during the home birth.
In examining section 2052, the California Supreme Court in Bowland observed two separate and distinct prohibitions embodied in the
code:
It may be seen that the ... section appears to proscribe two types of
medically related activities. It is unlawful, first, for an unlicensed
person to practice or hold himself out as practicing any 'system or
mode of treating the sick or afflicted'; second, the prohibition extends
to any actual diagnosis, treatment, surgery or prescription for a
'mental or physical condition' whether or not such activities comprise
a system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted. 2 '
Thus, the first offense prohibited is the treatment of the "sick or afflicted" by an unlicensed person.22 The second prohibition forbids the
diagnosis, treatment, surgery or prescription for any ailment, blemish,
deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder, injury, or other physical or
mental condition of any person. Under this prohibition, the Bowland
court concluded that the practice of lay midwifery constituted practicing medicine without a license. The court stated:
Thus, although normal childbirth is not a 'sickness or affliction'
within the meaning of section 2141, we conclude, in light of the total
statutory scheme governing the practice of the 'healing arts', that section 214 I's prohibition against unlicensed persons treating a 'physical
18. 18 Cal. 3d at 494, 556 P.2d at 1088-89, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
19. See id. at 495, 556 P.2d at 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 638.

20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
21. 18 Cal. 3d at 485, 556 P.2d at 1083, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
22. See id. at 491, 556 P.2d at 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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condition' was intended to encompass the practice of midwifery.2 3
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

From a defense perspective, at least one commentator has shown
that the Bowland court committed two errors in rejecting the privacy
argument. z4 First, the court failed to recognize the difference between
the state interest in regulating third trimester abortions and the state
interest in regulating a child's delivery. In childbirth, the interest of the
mother as well as the interest of the state are completely compatible
since the primary concern of both is the protection of the health of
mother and child. In the abortion scenerio however, the primary interest in the overwhelming percentage of cases clearly is not the health of
the unborn child but rather the physical and emotional health of the
mother. Additionally, abortions in California can only be performed
by a state licensed physician, whereas childbirth for a mother need not
incur any medical intervention. Clearly, significant policy distinctions
distinguish the Roe v. Wade abortion analysis from the childbirth
analysis.
The second error of the Bowland decision was the refusal of the court
to consider medical evidence demonstrating the relative safety of lay
midwife assisted home births. As set forth in Roe v. Wade, the compelling state interest in the proscription of third trimester abortions was
based on present medical knowledge.2 5 Additionally, Roe v. Wade
took judicial notice of the fact that maternal mortality for abortions
performed during the first trimester may be less than the mortality rate
for normal childbirths.2 6 In contrast, the Bowland court, which purportedly relied in significant part on the logic of Roe v. Wade, did not
consider the body of medical evidence related to the safety of home
births.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Midwives do not urge that all births should take place in the home,
but rather that hospitalization for all births is ill considered. 7 Certain
dangers unique to a hospital are arguably not present in home birth,
23. See id. at 491, 556 P.2d at 1086-87, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36; see also Comment, Midwifery" A History of Statutory Suppression, 9 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 631, 637 (1978-79).
24. See Comment, supra note 2, at 110-13; see also Comment, supra note 23, at 636-38.
25. 410 U.S. 113, 149-50, 163.
26. Id.
27. D. STEWART, THE FIVE STANDARDS FOR SAFE CHILDBEARING 201-280 (1981); see also,
S. ARMS, IMMACULATE DECEPTION 273-74 (1975); Devitt, The Transitionfrom Home to Hospital
Birth in the U.S., BIRTH & FAMILY J., 4:47-58 (1977).
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including the greater risk of infection.28 In one study, newborn infection rates were found to be four times higher in the hospital than at
home. 29 Furthermore, from 1975 to 1978, the infection rates of surgery
in obstetrical wards, including cesarean surgery, increased by 26%.30
This increase occurred even though the infection rates for all other surgical services in the United States during that same time period decreased by 16%. 31
A 1973 nationwide study in Holland showed that 53% of all births
occurred at home, with the balance occurring in health facilities. Midwives attended 67% of the home births and 37% of all births. The infant mortality rate was 11.5 per 1,000. In contrast, the infant mortality
rate in the United States during 1973, with its low rate of home births,
was 17.7 per 1,000.32
Another study, conducted by the State of North Carolina and the
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, examined all out-of-hospital births for the years 1974, 1975, and 1976. 33
The newborn mortality rate for planned home births attended by lay
midwives was 4 per 1,000. 34 In contrast, the newborn mortality rate in
3
North Carolina hospitals over that same period was 12 per 1,000. 1

The authors of the study concluded:
...

if carefully screened low-risk deliveries at home with trained

attendants are associated with low neonatal mortality, then there
should be no reason for elimination of home delivery as an alternative supported by the medical community .... [H]ome delivery and
delivery in specialized birth centers by trained personnel, such as
nurse-midwives, may have a cost advantage over hospital delivery
without unacceptable risk.... [T]he training of non-physician at36
tendants needs to be improved and expanded, not phased out.
The largest statistical study comparing data on home births and hospital births was undertaken by physicians of the New York Academy of
28. See T. Chard, & M. Richards, Benfits & Hazardsof the New Obstetrics, Dev. Med. Pub.
section 64, 169 Spas. Intern'l. Med. Publications, Lippincott, Philadelphia, (1977).
29. See L. Mehl, Scientflc Research on ChildbirthAlternatives: Wat it Tells Us About Hospital Practice, in D. STEWART, & L. STEWART, COMPULSORY HoSPITALIZATION OR FREEDOM OF
CHOICE IN CHILDBIRTH?, 171-208 (1978).

30. See Trends in Surgical Wound Infection Rates, U.S. Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report, Center for Disease Control, U.S. PHS, 29:3:27, (Jan. 25, 1980).
31. Id.
32. See Department of Consumer Affairs, SB 1829 Information Paper on The Professional
Midwifery Practice Act of 1980 3 (March 25, 1980); see also, Comment, supra note 2, at 98-99.
33. Burnett, Jones, Rooks, Tyler, Miller, Home Delivery & NeonatalMortality In N.C., J. Am.
Med. Assoc., 244:2741 (Dec. 19, 1980). A total of 1,296 births occurred outside hospital during
those years. Id.
34. Id. at 2743. 768 planned home births were attended by midwives. Id.
35. Id. A total of 242,245 births occurred in North Carolina hospitals during this period. Id.
36. See D. STEWART, supra note 27, at 264.
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Medicine in 1933.1 7 While admittedly an old study, it is significant because of the large number of births considered. The study encompassed data on the 348,200 births in New York City from 1930 to 1932.
Two thousands five hundred and nineteen of the births were attended
by midwives at home and 318,701 births were attended by physicians
with three-fourths of these births in hospitals. The New York Academy found that the maternal mortality rate of midwife assisted births
was significantly lower than physician-assisted births, even though the
midwives were more often attending the poor, "a group of women
'38
whose childbearing as a group is more hazardous than the average.
The study concluded that the relative safety of the home birth should
be recognized.39
CALIFORNIA MEDICAL EVIDENCE

A recent study conducted by a team from the Department of Gynecology and Obstetrics of the Stanford University School of Medicine
evaluated the safety of home delivery by lay midwives.4 0 The study
conducted in Santa Cruz County found that both the newborn mortality rate and the prematurity rate were significantly lower in the home
birth group than in the country as a whole. The success of the home
birth group was attributed to a lack of anesthesia, good prenatal care
and preparation of the mothers, avoidance of the supine position standard in most hospitals and a general lack of fear and other maternal
stresses usually present in a hospital birth.4 '
In a subsequent matched population study conducted by the same
author,42 1,046 home birth couples were matched to 1,046 hospital
birth couples for maternal age, number of previous pregnancies, years
of education, socioeconomic status and risk factors including presentation (vertex, brow, breech, etc.), multiparity (twins, etc.), previous
cesarean, pre-existing hypertension and symptoms of pre-eclampsia.
The results revealed hospital application of forceps was 21.4 times
greater than in home births. At the same time, the rate of episiotomies
was nine times greater and cesarean births were three times more fre37. See MaternalMortality in New York City, 1930-32, ,New York Academy of Medicine,
Commonwealth Fund (1933); see also, D. STEWART, supra note 27, at 121.
38. See MaternalMortality in New York City, 1930-32, New York Academy of Medicine,
Commonwealth Fund (1933); see also STEWART, supra note 27, at 212.
39. See MaternalMortality in New York City, 1930-32, New York Academy of Medicine,
Commonwealth Fund (1933); see also STEWART, supra note 27, at 212.
40. See Mehl, Peterson, Shaw, Creevy, Compilationsof Home Birth An Analysis ofa Series
From Santa Cruz County, Caif/ornia, BIRTH & FAMILY J. 2:123-135 (1975).
41. Id.
42. Mehl, supra note 29, at 171-208.
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quent in the hospital. 4 3
The most illustrative example of the higher risk involved in hospital
births occurred in Madera County, California.' Prior to 1960, family
physicians attended births in Madera County. The mortality and prematurity rates for the newborn were relatively high in those years. For
example, in 1959, the neonatal mortality rate for the county was 23.9
per 1,000 births and prematurity rates were 11%. From 1960 to June
1963, nurse-midwives were provided by a special state-funded program
to practice in the Madera County Hospital. During their term of stay,
the neonatal mortality rate dropped to 10.3 per 1,000 while the prematurity rate decreased to 6.4%. In late 1963, the California Medical Association successfully terminated the program and replaced midwives
with obstetrician/gynecologists. Subsequently, from January 1964 to
June 1966, neonatal
deaths rose to 32.1 per 1,000 while prematurity
4
rates rose to

9.8%. 1

Even though these studies are clearly inconclusive, they are sufficient
at least to challenge the assumption of the Bowland court that the risks
of home births are sufficiently greater than those of hospital births to
give the state an interest in the unborn child's welfare that overrides the
individual privacy rights of the mother.46 Because this assumption is
arguably false, the California Supreme Court should not have recognized a compelling interest in prohibiting lay persons from assisting
home births without a sufficient consideration of relevant medical
evidence.
The Bowland court also failed to consider a mother's right to privacy
while giving birth to her child. The next section of this article will discuss the emergence of a home birth privacy right that is implicit in the
California Constitution.
THE EMERGENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL CALIFORNIA HOME BIRTH
PRIVACY RIGHT

In Bowland, the court rejected efforts by the defense to characterize
the federal right of privacy derived from the first, fourth, fifth, ninth
and fourteenth amendments as protecting a woman's choice of the
manner and circumstances in which her baby is born. 7 The Bowland
court noted that the United States Supreme Court had never addressed
43. Id.
44. NAPSA4C News, THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS
FOR SAFE ALTERNATIVES IN CHILDBIRTH 21 (Spring, 1982).

45. See Burnett, supra at 34, at 2743.
46. 18 Cal. 3d at 495, 556 P.2d at 1089, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
47. See generally Comment, supra note 2.
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the right so broadly. The federal privacy right, however, seems fundamentally enmeshed in medical decisions that are indispensable to the
proper effectuation of the interests protected by the United States
Constitution.4"
The United States Supreme Court is not the exclusive source for the
derivation and development of fundamental rights. State courts are
increasingly looking to their own constitutions as an alternative and
independent basis for developing the right to privacy.49 Article I, section I of the California Constitution provides for an explicit constitutional right to privacy. The section reads: "all people are by nature
free and independent and have certain inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
50
privacy."
Subsequent to the 1976 Bowland decision, the California Supreme
Court in City of Santa Barbarav. Adamson5 1 and Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers 2 began to refine the California privacy
right. InAdamson, the court ruled that the guarantee of privacy based
upon the California Constitution is more protective in areas involving
sexual freedom and familial autonomy than the federal counterpart. 3
In Myers, the California Supreme Court observed that the California
Constitution includes privacy as afundamental,compelling, andinalienable right. The court held that this right of privacy "protects our
homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our
personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate
with the people we choose ... ."154
In Myers, the court arguably provided the most helpful statement
that protects a mother's right to privacy in the childbirth setting. Although the case involved restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortions, the California court based its decision on the express state
constitutional guarantee of privacy. Importantly, the court stated that
similar constitutional concerns would arise if the issue were the refusal
48. As one commentator has observed, "In the continuum of life's fundamental decisions,
childbirth lies at the nexus between procreation and childbearing. Logic and precedent compel
the conclusion that childbirth is a fundamental decision protected by the right to privacy." Com-

ment, supra note 2, at 108.
49. For an excellent general discussion of California's privacy right, see generally, Gerstein,
California'sConstitutionalRight to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private Life, 9
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 385 (1982).
50. CAL. CONST., art. 1, §1 (as amended in 1974).
51. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
52. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
53. 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n. 3, 610 P.2d at 440 n. 3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3.
54. 29 Cal. 3d at 256, 625 P.2d at 780, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 867. (Meyers involved the right to

public funding for abortions).
55. Id. at 275, 625 P.2d at 792-93, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80; see Note, supra note 7, at 709-10.
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to provide medical care for women choosing childbirth rather than
abortion.5 6 The California Supreme Court went on to state:
Indeed, although in this instance the Legislature has adopted restrictions which discriminate against women who choose to have an abortion, similar constitutional issues would arise if the Legislature-as a
population control measure, for example-funded Medi-Cal abortions but refused to provide comparable medical care for poor women who choose childbirth. Thus, the constitutional question before
us does not involve a weighing of the value of abortion as against
childbirth, but instead concerns the protection of either procreative
57
choice from discriminatory governmental treatment.
In elaborating on the nature of the interest being protected by the
right to privacy, the Myers court found the following rights involved:
(1) the woman's fundamental rights to life and to choose whether to
bear children; (2) the woman's fundamental interest in the preservation
of her personal health; and (3) the woman's right to retain personal
control over her own body. 58 In the context of the expectant mother,
each of these interests is represented. Obviously, the expectant mother
enjoys the same fundamental rights.
The Myers court has provided a vehicle for the recognition of a fundamental privacy right in California. This privacy interest involves the
right to life; the choice to bear children unfettered by discriminatory
governmental regulation; and the right of the expectant mother to preserve her own health and the health of her child. This privacy interest
also includes the right to retain personal control over one's own body
during the birth of children. 9
Since the Bowland decision, several significant developments have
occurred affecting the practice of midwifing. The next section of this
article examines these developments that make reevaluation of the
Bowland decision imperative.
56. Id. at 256, 625 P.2d at 780, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 624 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
59. Id. at 274-75, 624 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. It is apparent that no precise High
Court ruling is forthcoming. This term, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorarito
hear cases regarding whether the government may require hospitalization for abortions, parental

consent for abortions on minors, signature on an informed consent form, a 24-hour hiatus between
informed consent and the performance of the abortion, and taking of tissue sample to be submitted for pathology report. Simpoulos v. Virginia, 102 S. Ct. 2265, (1982); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 102 S. Ct. 2266, (1982); Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas
City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 102 S. Ct. 2267, (1982). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
held consistently that state constitutions may provide more expansive protection of individual
rights than the United States Constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S.
74, 81, 2035, 2040-41, (1980).
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LAY MIDWIVES AND THE RIGHT TO WORK

The Bowland court specifically held that former section 2141 of the
Business and Professions Code proscribes lay midwife practice."0 The
court held that the statute prohibited the practice of a system or mode
of treating the "sick or afflicted by an unlicensed person," recognizing,

however, that pregnancy is not a "sickness or affliction" under this code

provision. Continuing to interpret the statute, the court ruled that section 2141 also prohibits the unlicensed diagnosis and treatment of 6a
"mental and physical condition", including pregnancy assistance. '
This conclusion was reached "in light of the total statutory scheme governing the practice of the 'healing arts'."62

Since the Bowland decision, the Committee to Study Alternatives in
Maternity Care, established by the California Legislature,63 specifically

found that the California criminal process is an inappropriate means to
regulate normal pregnancy operations and recommended that Business

and Professions Code section 2141 be amended to delete the phrase "or
other physical or mental condition."'

In 1981, Senate Bill 670 was pro-

posed by California State Senators Bill Greene and Barry Keene, and
Assemblyman Tom Bates. This proposed legislation was to provide for

a minimally intrusive, short term training program for lay midwife certification. Senate Bill 670 was defeated in Committee in both 1981 and
1982.65
Recently, the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance [hereinafter referred to as BMQA] has begun considering a proposal to deregulate the medical profession. 66 Under this proposal, the state would
60. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2141 provided in full:
Any person, who practices or attempts to practice, or who advertises or holds himself or
herself out as practicing, any system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted in this state,
or who diagnoses, treats, operates for, or prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity,
disease, disfigurement, disorder, injury or other mental or physical condition of any person, without having the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked certificate as provided in this
chapter, or without being authorized to perform such act pursuant to a certificate obtained in accordance with some other provision of law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
This is now CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §2052.

61. Bowland, 18 Cal. 3d at 491, 556 P.2d at 1086-87, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
62. Id. The court acknowledged that its construction of the statute was difficult in lieu of the
defendant's notation of statutes such as Business and Professions Code §551 which imposes the
duty of treating a newborn child's eyes not only upon physicians and midwives, but also upon
"any person" assisting in the birth. Id. See also HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §305. The defendants argued that such statutes, "extant both during the periods when midwifery certificates were
available and when they were not, evidence legislative recognition that unlicensed persons may
lawfully attend and assist a childbirth." The court, however, required "further indications of
legislative intent". 18 Cal. 3d at 490-91, 556 P.2d at 1086, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
63. See COMMITTEE TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES IN MEDICAL CARE. A REPORT TO THE 1978
LEGISLATURE ON ALTERNATIVES IN MEDICAL CARE (December, 1977).
64. Id.; see Comment, supra note 2, at 111 n.135.

65.

SENATE WEEKLY HISTORY

286 (1981-82 Reg. Sess.).

66. N.4PSAC News, supra note 44, at 21.
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continue to license physicians and allied health care practitioners, but
would no longer enforce laws against the unauthorized practice of
medicine.67 The Public Affairs Research Group, commenting on the
BMQA within the medical profession proposal, stated that the existing
system gives some groups more power and authority than they merit,6 8
wastes the talents and skills of others, stifles upward mobility, and
makes turf conflict inevitable. The proposal under consideration by the
BMQA would give consumers the freedom to consult licensed or unlicensed practitioners of their choosing. Anyone could become involved
in health care so long as the person did not engage in public deception
69
as to his credentials.

Since the Bowland decision, the practice of midwifery has been
reevaluated by the California Legislative and public interest groups. In
light of continuing social and legislative activity concerning midwifery
practice, therefore, the high court of California should reconsider
whether the expectant mother, under the California Constitution and
state law, possesses the private choice of assistance by a midwife during
the birth of her child.
SUPPLY AND DEMAND

California does not directly prohibit an expectant mother from
choosing to have her child in the privacy of her own home, but the
stringent statutory regulation limiting who may attend the home birth
has seriously restricted access to midwives by expectant mothers. 70 Approximately 90% of all mothers can have normal, spontaneous births
producing healthy babies without the need for medical intervention. 7 '
Because of this success rate and related factors, an increasing number
of expectant mothers are desiring home births attended by midwives,
rather than birth in traditional medical institutions.72 Out of hospital
births in the United States more than doubled from 1973 to 1977,
climbing from 22,500 to 49,000. This trend is expected to continue. 73
The number of people able to aid the increasing number of out of hospital births remains small. The total number of nurse-midwives in Cal67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 194-206.

71.

ARMS, IMMACULATE DECEPTION, A NEw LOOK AT WOMEN AND CHILDBIRTH IN

AMERICA 194-206 (1975).
72. Id. at 137, 147.
73. From a memorandum dated March 19, 1981 by the Office of Information of the National
Academy of Sciences, as reported in NAPSACNews, THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PARENTS & PROFESSIONALS FOR SAFE ALTERNATIVES IN CHILDBIRTH, (Summer 1981).
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ifornia had risen to only approximately 170. 7 1 In contrast, an estimated
that 500 lay
midwives in California are delivering nearly 5,000 babies
75
annually.
Clearly, the demand for midwife services will increase in the future.
A recent report to the California Senate Committee on Health and
Welfare categorized the following reasons for expanding the professional category of certified midwives: 76 (1) a shortage, as well as a geographic dislocation of physicians providing obstetrical services exists,
resulting in a substantial reduction of prenatal care; (2) the skills necessary to safely assist a woman in normal childbirth can be learned by
midwives; (3) the costs of maternity care are so high that many women
are forced to seek lower cost alternatives such as midwives; and (4) alternatives to traditional hospital births are being demanded by women
and their families but are discouraged under the standard obstetrical
hospital delivery system.
This continuing demand for the assistance of midwives has forced a
growing number of expectant mothers to face the unduly burdensome
dilemma of either having a hospital birth attended by a person not of
her own choosing and at a location and cost that the mother cannot
afford, or being a party to the lay midwife's criminal act of 'practicing
without a certificate'.7 7 This dilemma should not be ignored by the
courts of this state in the continuing absence of legislative solutions.
DOMESTIC APPLICATION EXCEPTION

Two exceptions to the unlicensed practice of medicine are embodied
in section 2058 of the California Business and Professions Code: a person may assist a childbirth (1) under emergency circumstances and
(2) under "the domestic administration of family remedies." 78 The
emergency exemption has been limited by subsequent decisions and is
not currently applicable to the planned home birth attendant situation.7 9 The latter provision, however, concerning the "domestic administration of family remedies" remains an enigma-both as to the nature
74. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 32, at 3.
75. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND WELFARE, STAFF ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 670

at 1-2 (as amended April 28, 1981). The report goes on to state that "to date the nurse midwife
program has not been widely utilized... this is due to: failure of medical community to embrace
the program; malpractice insurance premiums are substantial; lack of availability of approved
courses; and difficulty in obtaining admitting privileges to hospitals." Id.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Statutes such as Business and Professions Code section 2052 as applied to lay midwives

"can be understood only as an attempt to achieve with carrots what the government is forbidden
to achieve with sticks." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 n.77 (1978).
78. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2058.
79. See Bowland, 18 Cal. 3d at 491, 556 P.2d at 1086, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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and the extent of the protection provided."0
In Bowland, the court held that the family remedy encompassed "informal recommendations among friends as to the efficacy of nonprescription vitamin compounds or ocean cruises" as well as "the presence
during childbirth of a husband, friend or relative who merely offers
verbal reassurance, soothing massage, or assistance in breathing exercises."' I Nevertheless, the court refused to recognize the lay midwife as
within the meaning of the statute since the California Legislature had
characterized midwifery as a "healing art". 2
The logic of the Bowland court in excluding midwifery from this exception is subject to question. The nature of an exception presumes the
conclusive effect of other sections of the statutory code on the exempted
activity. 3 Otherwise, a specific statutory exemption would not be necessary. To hold that midwifery should not be included under the umbrella of the section due to its prior categorization as a 'healing art' is to
avoid the task of defining the precise activities of the midwife that
bring the practice of midwifery within the family remedy exception.
The high court has provided a poor basis upon which to distinguish
which activities of midwives are of the healing art variety. This author
does not suggest that none of the activities of a midwife may be regulated by the license requirement. Rather, the court in light of the family remedy language, could accomplish its intent to harmonize all
sections of the statutory code relating to midwives by turning to a precise analysis of midwife activity.
The acceptance by the Bowland court of a relative or friend's presence under the protective canopy of section 2058-provided the assistance is limited to 'verbal reassurance, soothing massage, or assistance
in breathing exercises'--is at least an acknowledgment that certain activities performed by a person other than a licensed practitioner come
within the exception for domestic administration of family remedies.
An examination remains for the California Supreme Court to determine the precise acts of the lay midwife that fall within section 2058.
80. There is no extensive case law discussion of the legislative intent behind the so-called
Good Samaritan legislation contained in section 2144. However, such legislation commences in
the second paragraph of that section. See, e.g., Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885, 890-91,
144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627-28 (1978).
81. 18 Cal. 3d at 492, 556 P.2d at 1037, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The root of the language
"domestic administration of family remedies" may be traced to the original 1913 Cal. Stat., 354,
§22. No legislative history or subsequent case law interpretation (except Bowland) is apparent to

this author.
82. 18 Cal. 3d at 491, 556 P.2d at 1086, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
83. For example, see the court's discussion of statutory 'exceptions' in Newhouse v. Board of
Osteopathic Examiners, 159 Cal. App. 2d 728, 735-36, 324 P.2d 687, 692 (1958).
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In the absence of this analysis, the public is without guidance as to
what conduct of the lay midwife is prohibited from engaging in.
CONCLUSION

When the privacy concerns of an expectant mother who chooses
assistance during homebirth by a lay midwife resurface before the California Supreme Court, the court will be hard pressed to ignore the issues raised in this article. The author has shown that in analyzing the
privacy parameters set forth in Roe v. Wade, the California Supreme
Court must acknowledge the significant policy differences that distinguish Roe v. Wade from Bowland. In Bowland, the court failed to discern the difference between the state interest in regulating third
trimester abortions and the state interest in regulating a child's delivery. The failure to distinguish these interests caused the court to improperly find a compelling state interest in regulating childbirth. As a
result, significant privacy concerns of the expectant mother were ignored. This error of the court was due in part to the failure to consider
significant medical evidence related to the safety of midwife assisted
home births.
The interim refinement of the California right of privacy makes the
position of the court in Bowland much less tenable. The California
Supreme Court in City of SantaBarbarav. Adamson and Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers has significantly expanded the
California privacy right. It appears evident that the court, through
Adamson and Myers, must now modify its approach and recognize the
legitimate privacy concerns of the birthing mother. Additionally, the
court must deal more precisely with the "family remedy" exception of
California Business and Professions Code section 2058. Bowland does
little to provide guidance on the specific activities of the lay midwife
that are prohibited. An analysis of specific activities must be undertaken to determine which activities of the lay midwife come within the
exception. Using this analysis, the court could conclude that in light of
the total statutory scheme governing the practice of the healing art, the
statutory prohibition against unlicensed persons treating a physical
condition was not intended to encompass the practice of midwifery.
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